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HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE 
and ANY SUCCESSOR JUDGES 
OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF MANDAMUS 
Case No. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully petition for a 
writ of mandaitius compelling the lower court to vacate para-
graph 2 of the Order of February 23rd , 1987. (Exhibit A.) 
This petition is supported by the memorandum of 
authorities filed herewith. 
DATED this +f*H) day of / i\l/tch) , 1987. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys .£or Appellants 
Paragraph 1 of the Order deals with an amendment to the 
pleadings. Appellants do not concede that paragraph 1 is 
correct. However, a writ of mandamus is not the appropriate 
vehicle to challenge the allowance of amended pleadings. 
Appellants reserve the right to challenge paragraph 1 of the 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
April 6, 1907 
>FFICE OF THE CLERK 
obert J. DeBry 
OBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
alt Lake City, UT 84107 
FILE 
ohn Call and Clark Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
enkins, 
Plain tiffs and Appellants 
u. No. 870098 
onorable Dauid B. Dee and 
ny Successory Judges of the 
hird District Court, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
"•IIS DAY, Petition for Writ of Mandamus is granted and uirit 
tall issue. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ft. 1 1 
NICK J, COLESSIDES 
Attorney for Defendant 
610 East South Temple - Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 521-4441 
IN ..THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL .and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs, ORDER 
vs. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH Civil No, C 78-829 
Defendant- : 
Plaintiffs1 and defendant's respective motions came on 
regularly for hearing, pursuant to notice, before the Honorable David 
K. Winder, on the 19th day of April, 19787-the named plaintiffs herein 
being represented by their attorney Valden P. Livingston, and defen-
dant being represented by .its city attorney Nick J. Coiessides, and 
the Court .having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, and having 
heard argument of counsel and reviewed the memoranda and points of 
authority and case law submitted by and on behalf of both parties, 
now upon motion of Nick J. Coiessides, attorney for defendant, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs1.Motion for Declaration of a Class Action be 
and it is hereby denied, and further, that this action can not be 
appropriately maintained as a class action. 
2. Plaintiffs1 Motion .to Restrict Communications to Poten-
tial Class Members be and it is hereby denied. 
3. Defendant's Objections to the Adequacy of Bond Posted 
by plaintiff be and it is hereby overruled. 
4. Defendant is hereby ordered to answer or 'otherwisQ^pioad" 
within thirty (30) days to the interrogatories and Request of Production 
of Documents propounded by plaintiffs, in so far as the same relate 
to the named plaintiffs. 
Dated this ^ day of April, 1978. 
ATTEST 
C~v2C „ DAVID K. WINDTER 
D i s t r i c t J u d g e ^4$AlxQJr&A:&& 
n V r i7T\7rYDnV^ v^ ' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to Valden P. Livingston, 
attorney for plaintiffs, 2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203, Salt Lake 
'
}/S'' City, Utah 84117, postage prepaid, this / r day of April, 1978, by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail. 
' ) : / • • ) A / 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 63-30-13, Utah Code [enacted in 1965 and applicable 
through April 1978]: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety days after the cause of action 
arises; provided, however, that any claim filed 
against a city or incorporated town under section 
63-30-8 shall be governed by the provisions of 
section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Section 10-7-77, Utah Code [effective 1898 to May 1977]: 
. . . Every other claim, other than claims above 
mentioned, against any city or town must be 
presented, properly itemized or described and 
verified as to correctness by the claimant or his 
agent, to the governing body within one year after 
the last item of such account or claim accrued, and 
if such account or claim is not properly or 
sufficiently itemized or described or verified, the 
governing body may require the same to be made more 
specific as to itemization or description, or to be 
corrected as to the verification thereof. 
Section 10-7-78, Utah Code [effective 1898 to May 1977]: 
It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to any 
action or proceeding against a city or town in any 
court for the collection of any claim mentioned in 
section 10-7-77, that such claim had not been 
presented to the governing body of such city or 
town in the manner and within the time specified in 
section 10-7-77; . . . 
Section 63-30-13, Utah Code [effective May 1978]: 
A claim against a political subdivision is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing 
body of the political subdivision within one year 
after the cause of action arises. 
Section 63-30-15, Utah Code [amended in 1978 and effective to 
May 1985]: 
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an 
action in the district court against the 
governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
The action must be commenced within one year after 
denial or the denial period as specified in this 
chapter. 
d / i t t ~ » II«- It 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN TIERRA CORPORATION, 
ARNOLD DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
BRIGHTON BUILDERS, INCORPORATED, 
R & D ENGINEERS, INCORPORATED, 
and COVECREST PROPERTIES, 
Plaintiffs 
vs 
THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
J u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h i s appea l i s g r a n t e d t o t h e Utah 
Supreme C o u r t p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f S e c t i o n 
7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 ) ( j ) , Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Th is appea l p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : 
1 . Whe the r a c l a i m a n t can s u c c e s s f u l l y m a i n t a i n an 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t a g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y when t h e c l a i m a n t has 
n o t c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e p e r t i n e n t s t a t u t o r y and p l e a d i n g 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
2 . Whe the r c l a i m a n t s who have " s l e p t on t h e i r c l a i m s " 
can now a s s e r t a t o l l i n g o f t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e o f 
l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e b a s i s o f l i t i g a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e y were 
neve r a p a r t y and upon wh ich t h e y a p p a r e n t l y never r e l i e d . 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 9000186 
STATUTES WHERE INTERPRETATION IS DISPOSITIVE 
The text of statutes, the interpretation of which is 
dispositive, are set forth fully at "Exhibit D" of the 
Addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves the separate claims of five 
separate plaintiffs. The cases were consolidated and 
adjudicated by the trial court, from whence this appeal was 
taken. 
The causes of action of the individual plaintiffs arose 
between 1975 and 1978, when the Plaintiffs paid the "impact 
fees" for which they seek refund. Litigation to recover those 
fees was not commenced by the named plaintiffs until 1987 and 
1988. 
This action is the "second generation" of cases arising 
from the so-called "Wescall case", decided by this Court as 
John Call and Clark Jenkins vs City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 
217 (Utah 1979), on rehearing 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980), 
following remand 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), following remand 
127 Utah Adv Rep 38 (Utah Court of Appeals 1990). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements concerning the filing of a "notice of claim" 
against the governmental entity as a prerequisite to 
litigation. The Plaintiffs have also failed to properly plead 
compliance with the statute and their complaints are fatally 
defective. 
The Plaintiffs1 causes of action arose when they paid 
the impact fee for which they seek refund. Those fees were 
paid in 1975, 1977 and 1978 between nine and thirteen years 
BEFORE the instant litigation was filed. Their claims are 
barred by numerous statutes of limitation. Those statutes of 
limitation were not and should not be tolled. 
Numerous factual issues preclude the granting the 
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. The Defendant is 
not prevented from asserting and litigating those factual 
issues, as those issues were NOT litigated in the "Wescall" 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e C i t y ' s m o t i o n f o r P a r t i a l 
Summary J u d g m e n t . Ru le 56 o f t h e U tah R u l e s o f C i v i l 
P rocedure p r o v i d e s t h a t summary judgment i s a p p r o p r i a t e where 
t h e r e a r e no g e n u i n e i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l f a c t and the moving 
p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . Bo th o f 
t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s were p r e s e n t i n t h i s c a s e . A f t e r s e v e r a l 
h e a r i n g s on t h i s and a n c i l l a r y i s s u e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
g r a n t e d t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t . 
The f o l l o w i n g f a c t s are no t i n d i s p u t e : 
1 . I n J a n u a r y 1975 t h e West J o r d a n C i t y C o u n c i l 
a d o p t e d an o r d i n a n c e [ h e r e i n a f t e r " t h e i m p a c t f e e 
O r d i n a n c e 1 1 ] , wh ich r e q u i r e d s u b d i v i s i o n d e v e l o p e r s t o pay an 
impac t f ee o r p r o v i d e i n - k i n d f l o o d - c o n t r o l and p a r k s and 
r e c r e a t i o n i m p r o v e m e n t s as a c o n d i t i o n o f s u b d i v i s i o n 
deve lopment a p p r o v a l . 
2. The Plaintiffs paid' impact fees (and/or made the 
in-kind contributions) to the City pursuant to the impact fee 
Ordinance, at the approximate dates listed: 
Date Subdivision 
June 1975 Magic Valley #2 
November 1976 Nottingham Moor 
February 1977 McHeather 
May 1977 Cathleen 
June 1977 Jordan Grove #5 
September 1977 Dimondville 
August 1978 Lessley Estates 
August 1978 Linsey Estates 
August 1978 Vista Via 
3 . 
Named P l a i n t i f f 
R & D E n g i n e e r s 
A r n o l d Development Co 
Amer ican T i e r r a Corp 
Amer ican T i e r r a Corp 
Amer ican T i e r r a Corp 
A r n o l d Development Co 
B r i g h t o n B u i l d e r s 
A r n o l d Development Co 
C o v e c r e s t P r o p e r t i e s 
No " n o t i c e o f c l a i m " d e s i g n a t i n g t h e " c l a i m " as 
b a s e d upon t h e C i t y ' s a l l e g e d f a i l u r e t o c o n d u c t a " p u b l i c 
h e a r i n g " p r i o r t o a d o p t i o n o f t h e i m p a c t f e e O r d i n a n c e was 
e v e r f i l e d w i t h t h e C i t y by t h e a b o v e - l i s t e d P l a i n t i f f s . 2 
4 . I n November 1987 f o u r o f t h e a c t i o n s were f i l e d 
a g a i n s t t h e C i t y . The f i f t h a c t i o n [R&D E n g i n e e r s as 
1 This statement is made strictly upon the pleadings of the 
Plaintiffs. This statement should not be construed as a 
waiver of the requirement imposed by order of the trial court 
upon the Plaintiffs to file an affidavit establishing the 
amount of their claim. Nor shall this statement be deemed an 
admission that the "named Plaintiffs" made the payments or 
that the named Plaintiffs are the proper parties to the 
litigation. 
Even if the Plaintiffs claim, as they apparently do, that the 
November 1977 letter from Valden Livingston constituted a 
"notice of claim" filed in behalf of these plaintiffs which 
point is vigorously contested by the Defendant as (1) the 
letter does not identify those other subdivisions or parties 
AND (2) Mr Livingston had no authority to make a claim in 
their behalf the statute of limitation issue is still 
present. In fact, it is even more significant because the 
actions should have been filed within one year of the filing 
of the "notice of claim". 
4. In November 1987 four of the actions were filed 
against the City. The fifth action [R&D Engineers as 
Plaintiffs] was filed in July 1988. 
The impact fees, for which this litigation seeks 
refund, were paid in 1975 to 1978 some NINE to THIRTEEN 
YEARS BEFORE the corresponding litigation was filed. 
I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT COMPLIED WITH 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO FILE AND 
MAINTAIN LITIGATION AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY 
A. Failure to comply with procedural requirements 
Section 63-30-13, Utah Code, enacted by the Legislature 
in 1965 and applicable through April 1978, provides: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety days after the cause of action 
arises; provided, however, that any claim filed 
against a city or incorporated town under section 
63-30-8 shall be governed by the provisions of 
section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Section 10-7-77, Utah Code, which was initially adopted 
in 1898 and was last adopted in the last major recodification 
of state statutes in 1953, described the procedures for 
claims for injuries for "defective sidewalks11 and other 
unsafe conditions and then provided, in part: 
. . Every other claim, other than claims above 
mentioned, against any city or town must be 
presented, properly itemized or described and 
verified as to correctness by the claimant or his 
agent, to the governing body within one year after 
the last item of such account or claim accrued, and 
if such account or claim is not properly or 
sufficiently itemized or described or verified, the 
governing body may require the same to be made more 
specific as to itemization or description, or to be 
corrected as to the verification thereof. 
9 
Emphasis added. Section 10-7-78, Utah Code, further provided: 
It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to any 
action or proceeding against a city or town in any 
court for the collection of any claim mentioned in 
section 10-7-77, that such claim had not been 
presented to the governing body of such city or 
town in the manner and within the time specified in 
section 10-7-77; . . . 
Emphasis added. 
Sections 10-7-77 and 10-7-78 were effective during which 
some of the claims of some of the Plaintiffs arose; those 
provisions governed some of those claims. 
In 1978 the Legislature repealed Sections 10-7-77 and 
10-7-78 and adopted new provisions for Section 63-30-13, 
which thus read: 
A claim against a political subdivision is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing 
body of the political subdivision within one year 
after the cause of action arises. 
Emphasis added. Section 63-30-15, Utah Code, amended in 1978 
and effective to May 1985^, provided: 
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an 
action in the district court against the 
governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
The action must be commenced within one year after 
denial or the denial period as specified in this 
chapter. 
Emphasis added. [Section 63-30-14, provides that the claim 
will be deemed to be denied if not approved or denied within 
nipety days by the governmental entity.] 
3 Subsequent amendments to Section 63-30-15, Utah Code, have no 
effect upon the outcome of this case. Those subsequent 
amendments merely reaffirm that the litigation must be 
commenced within one year of the denial of the claim. 
10 
The f o r e g o i n g s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s a re a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 " c l a i m s " as t h o s e " c l a i m s a r o s e " and f o r t h e 
p e r t i n e n t t i m e p e r i o d s t h e r e a f t e r . 
NO "NOTICE OF CLAIM" FROM THE INSTANT PLAINTIFFS FOR 
REFUND OF THE MONIES PAID BY THEM, SAID REFUND JUSTIFIED BY 
THE CITY'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO HOLD A "PUBLIC HEARING", WAS 
EVER—-EVEN NOW —PRESENTED TO THE CITY. 
The Utah Supreme Cour t has c o n s i s t e n t l y i n t e r p r e t t e d t h e 
f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n s . S e c t i o n 1 0 - 7 - 7 7 amounts t o a l i m i t a t i o n 
s t a t u t e . H a m i l t o n vs S a l t Lake C i t y , 99 Utah 362 , 106 Pac. 
1 0 2 8 . The L e g i s l a t u r e has an undoub ted and a b s o l u t e r i g h t t o 
impose such c o n d i t i o n s (as c o n t a i n e d i n S e c t i o n 1 0 - 7 - 7 7 ) upon 
t h e r i g h t t o sue a m u n i c i p a l i t y . Sweet vs S a l t Lake C i t y , 43 
Utah 306 , 134 Pac. 1167. P r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e o f t h e c l a i m i s 
a CONDITION PRECEDENT t o b r i n g i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e 
m u n i c i p a l i t y . Brown vs S a l t Lake C i t y , 33 Utah 222 , 93 Pac. 
570 ( 1 9 0 8 ) ; H u r l e y vs Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589 , 28 Pac. 
213 ( 1 9 2 4 ) . A c t i o n s are b a r r e d by f a i l u r e t o comp ly w i t h t h e 
r e q u i r e m e n t s o f S e c t i o n 1 0 - 7 - 7 7 . Dahl vs S a l t Lake C i t y , 45 
Utah 544 , 147 Pac. 622 ( 1 9 1 5 ) ; Nelson vs Logan C i t y , 103 Utah 
3 5 6 , 135 P a c . 259 ( 1 9 4 3 ) ; Baugh vs Logan C i t y , 27 Utah 2d 
2 9 1 , 495 P.2d 814 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . Even t h e f a c t t h a t employees of t h e 
g o v e r n m e n t knew o f t h e i n j u r e d p l a i n t i f f s cause o f a c t i o n 
d o e s n o t d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e n e c e s s i t y o f f i l i n g a t i m e l y 
c l a i m . Edwards vs I r o n County, 531 P.2d 476 (U tah 1 9 8 1 ) . 
I n 1978 t h e L e g i s l a t u r e amended S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 1 , U tah 
Code, t o read i n p a r t : 
11 
Any p e r s o n h a v i n g a c l a i m f o r i n j u r y t o pe rson or 
p r o p e r t y a g a i n s t a g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y o r i t s 
e m p l o y e e s h a l l , b e f o r e m a i n t a i n i n g an a c t i o n under 
t h i s a c t , f i l e a w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f c l a i m w i t h s u c h 
e n t i t y f o r a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f i n c l u d i n g money 
d a m a g e s . The n o t i c e o f c l a i m s h a l l s e t f o r t h a 
b r i e f s t a t e m e n t o f t h e f a c t s and t h e n a t u r e o f t h e 
c l a i m a s s e r t e d , s h a l l be s i g n e d by t h e p e r s o n 
m a k i n g t h e c l a i m or such p e r s o n ' s a g e n t , a t t o r n e y , 
p a r e n t or l e g a l g u a r d i a n , and s h a l l be d i r e c t e d and 
d e l i v e r e d t o t h e r e s p o n s i b l e g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y 
w i t h i n t h e t i m e p r e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 2 o r 
6 3 - 3 0 - 1 3 , as a p p l i c a b l e . 
Emphasis added . Th i s s e c t i o n r e q u i r e s t he p l a i n t i f f , p r i o r t o 
m a i n t a i n i n g an a c t i o n , t o " f i l e a w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f c l a i m . . 
. r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e f u n c t i o n g i v i n g r i s e t o 
t h e c l a i m i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d as g o v e r n m e n t a l . " Cox vs Utah 
M o r t g a g e and Loan C o r p o r a t i o n , 716 P.2d 783 a t 786 ( U t a h 
1 9 8 6 ) ; see a l s o Richards vs L e a v i t t , 716 P.2d 276 (U tah 1985) 
and Madsen vs B o r t h i c k , 658 P.2d 627 (U tah 1 9 8 3 ) . F a i l u r e t o 
f i l e s u c h a w r i t t e n n o t i c e i s " f a t a l l y d e f e c t i v e " t o a 
c o m p l a i n t . Roosendahl C o n s t r u c t i o n & Mining Corpora t ion vs 
Ho lman , 503 P.2d 446 ( U t a h 1 9 7 2 ) . As t h e P l a i n t i f f s have 
n e g l e c t e d t o comply w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e 
f o r e g o i n g s t a t u t e s , t h e i r C o m p l a i n t s must be d i s m i s s e d w i t h 
p r e j u d i c e . Cox, s u p r a . ; Yates vs Verna l Family H e a l t h Cente r , 
617 P.2d 352 (U tah 1 9 8 0 ) . 
The o b j e c t i v e s o f t he " n o t i c e o f c l a i m " r e q u i r e m e n t s o f 
t h e G o v e r n m e n t a l I m m u n i t y Ac t were r e c o g n i z e d by t h e U tah 
Supreme C o u r t i n Sea rs vs S o u t h w o r t h , 563 P.2d 192 ( U t a h 
1 9 7 7 ) , i n wh ich t h e Cour t s t a t e d : 
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Among o t h e r r e a s o n s , n o t i c e o f c l a i m p r o v i d e s t h e 
g o v e r n m e n t a l u n i t w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r o m p t l y 
i n v e s t i g a t e and t o remedy any d e f e c t i m m e d i a t e l y , 
b e f o r e a d d i t i o n a l i n j u r y i s c a u s e d ; i t h e l p s a v o i d 
u n n e c e s s a r y l i t i g a t i o n ; i t m i n i m i z e s d i f f i c u l t i e s 
t h a t m igh t a r i s e f rom changes i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . 
563 P.2d at 193 . C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . 
In t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n , t h e P l a i n t i f f s have f a i l e d t o 
f i l e t h e p r o p e r " n o t i c e o f c l a i m " w i t h t h e C i t y . The Utah 
Supreme Cour t has c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t " w h e r e a cause o f 
a c t i o n i s b a s e d upon a s t a t u t e , f u l l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h i t s 
r e q u i r e m e n t s i s a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t t o t h e r i g h t t o 
m a i n t a i n a s u i t . " Scarborough vs G r a n i t e School D i s t r i c t , 531 
P.2d 480 a t 484 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) . T h i s r u l e da tes back t o Hamil ton 
vs S a l t Lake C i t y , 99 Utah 362 , 106 P.2d 1028 ( 1 9 4 0 ) , whe re in 
t h e Utah Supreme Cour t s t a t e d t h a t : 
The r i g h t t o r e c o v e r damages i s s t a t u t o r y ; i t can 
o n l y be a v a i l e d o f where t h e r e has been a 
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t he c o n d i t i o n s upon which the r i g h t 
i s c o n f e r r e d . Where a r i g h t i s g r a n t e d upon 
c o n d i t i o n s , one who s e e k s t o e n f o r c e t h e r i g h t 
mus t , by a l l e g a t i o n and p r o o f , b r i n g h i m s e l f w i t h i n 
t h e c o n d i t i o n s . 
The P l a i n t i f f s have c l e a r l y f a i l e d t o comply w i t h those 
s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h e i r c l a i m s c a n n o t be m a i n t a i n e d . 
Summary Judgmen t i n f a v o r o f t h e D e f e n d a n t was a p p r o p r i a t e 
and mandated by w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d case law d e c i s i o n . 
I n response t o D e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n s t h a t no " n o t i c e o f 
c l a i m " was f i l e d on b e h a l f o f t h e p r e s e n t P l a i n t i f f s , t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s have responded ( 1 ) t h a t t h e 1977 " W e s c a l l " l e t t e r 
was t h e r e q u i r e d " n o t i c e o f c l a i m " and (2 ) t h a t no " n o t i c e o f 
c l a i m " was needed . 
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Plaintiffs misread this Court's decision in El Rancho 
Enterprises vs Murray City, 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977). In that 
case, the plaintiffs were seeking "equitable relief" to 
enjoin future alleged "discrimination". Obviously the 
litigation itself was "notice" against the ongoing conduct 
sought to be enjoined. We do not have that situation in the 
instant case. The Plaintiffs are belatedly seeking a refund 
of monies allegedly paid by them. There is no ongoing conduct 
they are seeking to enjoin. 
The Plaintiffs similarly misconstrue the Court's 
decision in Jenkins vs Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983). In 
that case the Utah Supreme Court made clear the procedural 
context of the case: 
Jenkins is prosecuting this action under a separate 
statutory authorization, §59-11-11, which predates 
enactment of the Governmental Immunity Act and 
which provides a distinct and separate basis for 
his claim against the government. The cause of 
action authorized under §59-11-11 has its own 
notice provision in the form of the requirement to 
pay the tax under protest and has its own statute 
of limitation. See U.C.A., 1953, §78-12-31. It is 
not governed by the notice or undertaking 
requirements in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
675 P.2d at 1154. Emphasis added. 
B. Failure to comply with pleading requirements 
The Plaintiffs now claim that no "notice of claim" is 
required to be filed with the City as a prerequisite to this 
action. That must be their position, as no notice of claim 
was ever filed. However, that position is contravened by Mr 
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L i v i n g s t o n ' s l e t t e r (November 1977) wh ich c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s 
t h e c l a i m ( o n b e h a l f o f John C a l l and C l a r k J e n k i n s ) was 
f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 1 0 - 7 - 7 7 , Utah Code. 
I n Roosendahl C o n s t r u c t i o n & M i n i n g C o r p o r a t i o n vs 
Holman, 503 P.2d 446 (Utah 1 9 7 2 ) , t h e Utah Supreme Cour t was 
f aced w i t h a s i t u a t i o n i n wh ich no " n o t i c e o f c la im 1 1 had been 
f i l e d NOR HAD COMPLIANCE WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
EVEN BEEN ALLEGED. Concern ing t h e s t a t u s o f t h e c o m p l a i n t i n 
t h a t a c t i o n , t h i s Cour t w r o t e : 
A p r e r e q u i s i t e i n p u r s u i n g a c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e 
S t a t e or i t s o f f i c e r s i s a c o m p l i a n c e w i t h S e c t i o n 
6 3 - 3 0 - 1 2 , U.C.A. 1953, wh ich reads as f o l l o w s : 
[ Q u o t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ] 
I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t i s 
f a t a l l y d e f e c t i v e i n t h a t i t does not a l l e g e 
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h a t s e c t i o n . [ C i t a t i o n t o cases 
o m i t t e d . ] 
503 P.2d a t 4 4 8 . Emphas i s a d d e d . [ S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 2 p e r t a i n s 
t o c l a i m s f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e o f U t a h ; c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
p r o v i s i o n s f o r c l a i m s a g a i n s t a m u n i c i p a l i t y are c o n t a i n e d i n 
S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 3 . ] 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 t e r s e l y - w o r d e d ^ c o m p l a i n t s f a i l t o a l l e g e 
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 3 , Utah Code. Those c o m p l a i n t s 
a r e , pe r t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n R o o s e n d a h l , " f a t a l l y 
d e f e c t i v e " . 
4 The entirety of the operative allegations of the original complaints in these 
cases can be typed on a single side of a 3!fx5l! index card! Not bad for a claim 
for $40,000+. It is unfortunate that their subsequent pleadings and memoranda 
are not so similarly concise. 
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II 
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY 
NUMEROUS STATUTES OF LIMITATION 
In addition to the procedural and pleading defects 
associated with the filing (or actually, the non-filing) of a 
"notice of claim", the Plaintiffs1 claims are b arred by 
numerous "statutes of limitation". 
The Plaintiffs1 claims "arose" between the period 1975 
and 1978. The instant actions were filed in 1987 and 1988: 
some NINE TO THIRTEEN YEARS AFTER THE CLAIMS FIRST AROSE! 
A "six month" statute of limitation: 
Section 78-12-31, Utah Code, prescribes a "six month" 
statute of limitation for 
"an action against an officer, or an officer de 
facto: . . . (2) for money paid to any such officer 
under protest, . . . and which, it is claimed, 
ought to be refunded." 
Emphasis added. 
A "one year" statute of limitation: 
Section 78-12-30, Utah Code, adopted in 1953 and 
applicable at all times pertinent to the Plaintiffs' claims 
and this litigation, provides: 
Actions on claims against a county, city or 
incorporated town, . . . must be commenced within 
one year after the first rejection thereof by such 
. . . city council . . .". 
Emphasis added. 
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A "three year" statute of limitation: 
Section 78-12-26(2), Utah Code, adopted in 1953 and 
applicable in relevant part at all times pertinent to 
Plaintiffs' claims and this litigation, provides for a "three 
year" statute of limitation for "an action for taking, 
detaining, or injuring personal property." 
A "four year" statute of limitation: 
Section 78-12-25(4), Utah Code, adopted in 1953 and 
applicable in relevant part at all times pertinent to 
Plaintiffs1 claims and this litigation, provides for a "four 
year" statute of limitation for "an action not otherwise 
provided for by law." 
Any of the foregoing "statutes of limitations" could be 
applied against the Plaintiffs1 "stale" and "untimely" 
claims. 
In United States vs Kubrick, 444 US 111, 100 SCt 352, 62 
LEd2d 259 (1979) the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Statutes of limitations, which "are found and 
approved in all systems of enlightened 
jurisprudence," represent a prevasive legislative 
judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the 
adversary on notice to defend within a specified 
period of time and that "the right to be free of 
stale claims comes to prevail over the right to 
prosecute them." These enactments are statutes of 
repose; and although affording plaintiffs what the 
legislature deems a reasonable time to present 
their claims, they protect defendants and the 
courts from having to deal with cases in which the 
search for truths may be seriously impaired by the 
loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance 
of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of 
documents, or otherwise. 
444 US at 117. Emphasis added. Citations omitted. 
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The instant actions contravene those purposes. The 
"search for truth" is impaired and probably rendered 
impossible in a cases which are filed between NINE AND 
THIRTEEN YEARS AFTER THE CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGEDLY AROSE. 
The Defendant should not be obligated to defend such a stale 
action when many of the records, documents, and other written 
materials might have been misplaced, lost or even destroyed. 
[The 1985 "Municipal Financial Records General Records 
Retention Schedule", as promulgated by the Utah State 
Archives and Records Service pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title 
63, Utah Code, notes that many municipal financial records 
may be destroyed "after three years" retention. Thus, for 
monies given to the City in the mid- or late-1970s, those 
records could have been legally destroyed years BEFORE the 
Plaintiffs filed their litigation in 1987 and 1988! The City 
should not have to defend against such stale claims, 
especially when it ability to defend itself has been 
jeopardized by the passage of time.] 
The six month statute of limitation prescribed under 
Section 78-12-31 ought to come into play. Their instant 
claims seek the "refund of money" which they (arguably) 
characterized as a "tax". Such a "short" statute of 
limitation is fair, as the "tax" (i.e. impact fee monies) 
would otherwise be spent by the governmental agency which 
collected that "tax". 
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Certainly the "one year" statute of limitation of 
Section 78-12-30 is applicable. There is no way the 
Plaintiffs can overcome the bar to their claims it 
establishes! 
And whether EITHER the three year (§78-12-26) OR the 
four year (§78-12-25) statutes of limitation is also found to 
be applicable, the Plaintiffs1 "stale" and untimely claims 
are still barred! 
In the instant action, the Plaintiffs have waited too 
long. The statutes of limitations clearly bar their 
late-filed claims. Their cause of action, if any, against the 
City for refund of the impact fee arose at the time those 
impact fees were paid! The Plaintiffs CANNOT WAIT for NINE 
to THIRTEEN YEARS in which to file litigation to obtain the 
refund. 
8. The statute of limitations are not tolled. 
Plaintiffs1 analysis of the "statute of limitations" 
issues is creative, complicated, AND WRONG. 
First, they argue, there is no statute of limitations. 
Secondly, they argue, it is "four years". Plaintiffs argue 
that the Defendant has not pleaded "statutes of limitations" 
as a defense. And lastly, they argue, if there is a statute, 
that it is "tolled" until the July 1986 Call III decision. 
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P l a i n t i f f s r e f e r t o two n o n - U t a h c a s e s f o r t h e 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s NO " s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n " 
a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s t y p e o f c l a i m . A c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n o f 
t h o s e c a s e s r e v e a l s t h e e r r o r o f P l a i n t i f f s ' a n a l y s i s and 
c o n c l u s i o n . 
R a t c l i f f vs C i t y of H u r s t , 593 S.W.2d 863 (Texas Civ App 
1 9 8 0 ) , c i t e d by P l a i n t i f f s as a u t h o r i t y f o r a t o l l i n g o f t h e 
s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , i n v o l v e d a p r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n as t o 
whe the r t h e i r c a u s e o f a c t i o n had a c t u a l l y a r i s e n . Due t o 
t e c h n i c a l i t i e s o f t h e Texas s t a t u t e s as t o " s t a n d i n g " t o 
c o n t e s t t h e v a l i d i t y o f a m u n i c i p a l a n n e x a t i o n , t h e C o u r t 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e i r c l a i m s were t i m e l y f i l e d . The 
P l a i n t i f f s ' q u o t a t i o n s a n d / o r s t a t e m e n t s as t o t h e " s t a t u t e 
o f l i m i t a t i o n " i s s u e s a r e i n c o r r e c t , o u t - o f - c o n t e x t a n d / o r 
c o n t r a r y t o t h e c o u r t ' s a c t u a l h o l d i n g i n t h e c a s e . 
L a k e W o r t h T o w e r s , I n c . v s G e r s t u n g , 262 S o . 2 d 1 
( F l o r i d a 1972 ) i s i n c o r r e c t l y c i t e d by P l a i n t i f f s as 
" a u t h o r i t y " . Lake Worth Towers i n v o l v e d a c l a i m f o r 
i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f : t o e n j o i n t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e t a x e s o r 
e n j o i n t h e r e a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e t a x e s . The l i t i g a t i o n was 
f i l e d i n a t i m e l y f a s h i o n : i n t h e same tax year i n which t h e 
i n v a l i d t a x e s were p a i d . In such a s i t u a t i o n , t h e a b b r e v i a t e d 
60 -day p e r i o d u n d e r F l o r i d a l a w i n w h i c h t o b r i n g s u i t t o 
c h a l l e n g e t h e a s s e s s m e n t was u n r e a s o n a b l e . But t h e c o u r t ' s 
s t a t e m e n t s , as quo ted by t h e P l a i n t i f f s , i s mere d i c t a . I t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g t o r e f e r t o t he p o r t i o n o f t h e Lake Worth Towers 
d e c i s i o n wh ich was c o n v e n i e n t l y o m i t t e d by t h e P l a i n t i f f s : 
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But even as to property not subject to taxation at 
all because of its immunity or exempt status it is 
our view that if the tax assessed is paid, suit 
must be brought by the taxpayer against the county 
within one year after such payment to recover the 
amount paid pursuant to [Florida statute]; or if 
tax certificates or tax deed for such taxes 
thereon, suit to cancel the same must be brought 
within the time allowed by [Florida statute] for 
such purpose. The policy involved in such 
limitations and laches is that there must be a time 
when tax processes and procedures that have been 
completed should not be judicially disturbed; for 
examples, where tax funds received have been 
allocated or expended or intervening rights have 
accrued from tax delinquency enforcement 
proceedings prior to any authorized claim or suit 
being filed or instituted by the taxpayer. 
262 So.2d at 4-5. Emphasis added. 
Obviously, the text quoted by Plaintiffs (i.e. to the 
effect that there "is no statute of limitations") was not 
what the Florida court really said. Even in Florida, the 
affected entities would have to bring suit to collect the 
invalidly-assessed tax within "one year" of when it was paid! 
C. The properly pleaded "statutes of limitation" defense. 
Plaintiffs1 counsel icorrectly asserts [p. 30 of Mr 
DeBry's Brief] that the "defense" was not pleaded and is thus 
waived. AGAIN, Plaintiffs1 Counsel MISREPRESENTS BOTH FACT 
AND LAW. The "Third Defense" clearly states: 
3. This action, insofar as it seeks the recovery 
of money, is barred pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 78-12-1 et seq, Utah Code, including but 
not limited to the provisions of Section 
78-12-25(2) and Section 78-12-26(4), in that this 
action was not filed within the appropriate period 
before the "statute of limitation" barred 
recovery. 
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Emphasis added. . The "et seq" following the reference to 
Section 78-12-1 is a standard method of reference to all 
sections of Chapter 12 of Title 78. This "standard" method of 
reference should have been further obvious to Plaintiff's 
counsel by the phrase "including but not limited to . . .". 
Other "statute of limitations" defenses were properly 
pleaded in the Defendant's Answer: SECOND DEFENSE, NINTH 
DEFENSE, TENTH DEFENSE. The "defense" of "laches" was also 
properly pleaded: EIGHTH DEFENSE. 
D. The applicable "statute of limitation" 
The "statute of limitation" starts to run when the 
"cause of action arose" (not when the statute was "passed" or 
the ordinance "adopted"). Those claims arose in 1975 through 
1978. The Plaintiffs admit that there is a four-year statute 
of limitation. Yet they claim the statute is tolled. 
Plaintiffs casually explain away the "one year" statute 
of limitations, as being in conflict with the "more specific 
four-year statute of limitation" of §78-12-25(1). It is 
incredible to read §78-12-25(1), dealing with "open 
accounts", as being more "specific" than the provisions of 
Section 78-12-30, which deals specifically with litigation 
against a government entity. Obviously, only a governmental 
entity can have an "invalid law"; only a governmental entity 
may, pursuant to its police powers, exact "impact fees". 
Obviously, the "statute of limitation" applicable for suits 
against government entities MUST be the one to be followed. 
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Plaintiffs misread the decision in the case of Juab 
County Department of Public Welfare vs Summers, 426 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1967). That case does not say that the Court is to 
select the longer of two statutes of limitation. That case 
merely says that in cases where a cause of action arises 
under a "contract" or under a "statutory" theory, the cause 
of action with the longer statute of limitation is to be 
applied. 
To say that a general statute of limitation (four year, 
dealing obviously with a "commercial" setting) is applicable 
would frustrate the obvious legislative purpose in calling 
out a "one year" statute of limitation. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Ponderosa One Limited 
Partnership vs Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District, 738 
P.2d 635 (Utah 1987), is misplaced. The one-year statute of 
limitation was not litigated and apparently not an issue. The 
"holding" cannot be read to emasculate §78-12-30. Rather, the 
"holding" is merely that the "six month" statute was not 
applicable to that case. The Court clearly stated: 
We therefore hold that section 78-12-31(2) was 
improperly applied by the trial court, as the money 
Ponderosa paid under protest was not paid to an 
officer in his official capacity as a tax 
collector. 
738 P.2d at 637. Emphasis added. 
There could have been no adverse interpretation on 
§78-12-30, as the cause of action arose in July and the 
litigation was filed in March of the following year: well 
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w i t h i n t h e o n e - y e a r p e r i o d s t i p u l a t e d by § 7 8 - 1 2 - 3 0 . There i s 
n o t h i n g i n Ponderosa wh ich even m e n t i o n s , l e t a l one d e c i d e s , 
a n y t h i n g i n § 7 8 - 1 2 - 3 0 . 
The " o n e y e a r " s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n ( a v a i l a b l e t o a 
" m u n i c i p a l i t y " ) under §78 -12 -30 c o u l d NOT have been l i t i g a t e d 
i n Ponderosa as t h e d e f e n d a n t was a "sewer d i s t r i c t " ( w h i c h 
had no p r o t e c t i o n under § 7 8 - 1 2 - 3 0 ) ! 
T h i s h o l d i n g i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . In t h e 
i n s t a n t case t h e P l a i n t i f f s 1 a l l e g e d " n o t i c e o f c l a i m " ( t h e 
November 1977 l e t t e r o f Mr L i v i n g s t o n ) a s s e r t s t h a t t h e 
i m p a c t f e e i s " a t a x n o t a u t h o r i z e d by t h e U tah S t a t e 
L e g i s l a t u r e , or a tax i n excess o f t h e maximum t a x a l l o w e d by 
t h e Utah S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e . " The o r i g i n a l " W e s c a l l " c o m p l a i n t 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e " i m p a c t f e e " as a " t a x " . Mr L i v i n g s t o n i n 
a t l e a s t one o f h i s Memoranda f i l e d w i t h t h e C o u r t i n t h e 
" W e s c a l l " case made i t a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r t h a t t h e i r p o s i t i o n 
was t h a t t h e i m p a c t f e e was a " t a x . " 5 I t i s t h e P l a i n t i f f s 
( a n d / o r t h e i r a l l e g e d a g e n t ) w h i c h have c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e 
i m p a c t fee as a " t a x " ; c e r t a i n l y t h e y s h o u l d no t be harmed by 
a c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
From the P l a i n t i f f ' s "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Oral Argument i n 
Support of i t s Motion to Dismiss", dated as of 25 A p r i l 1978, Mr L i v i n g s t o n 
wrote: " . . . the monies paid by p la in t i f f s constitute a tax. . . . In such a 
case the funds are a tax, as they are used ' t o support the government of West 
J o r d a n . ' Even i f the funds were used fo r needs c rea ted by p l a i n t i f f s ' 
s u b d i v i s i o n , the payment i s s t i l l a tax as i t would be used to support a 
government func t i on . . . In add i t i on , whether the funds are used for p l a i n t i f f s ' 
subdiv is ion or for some other subdiv is ion does not matter on the question of the 
existence o f a tax." Memorandum, pp. 1-2. Emphasis added. 
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The Plaintiffs argue that the "four year" statute of 
limitation [under §78-12-25(1) "open accounts" and Ponderosa] 
should prevail over the so-called" general (Plaintiff's term) 
"one-year" statute applicable under §78-12-30. If the "open 
account" statute is deemed to prevail over the "one year" 
statute, then every other "statute" overrides the "one year" 
statute of limitation, the "one year" statute of limitation 
granted for suits against municipalities is meaningless. 
Obviously, the Legislature intended §78-12-30 to have some 
effect. Section 78-12-30 must be the controlling, specific 
statute of limitation. 
Ill 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARE NOT "TOLLED" 
A. Claimed "equitable tolling" 
Plaintiffs have advanced the doctrine of "equitable 
tolling" to avoid the application of the statutes of 
limitation. NO UTAH CASES ARE CITED IN SUPPORT OF THE CLAIMED 
DOCTRINE. 
An examination of the case cited as support of the 
doctrine shows the inapplicability of the doctrine to the 
instant situation. In Collier vs City of Pasadena, 191 Cal 
Rptr 681 (Cal App 1983) cited by Plaintiffs as "authority" 
for the doctrine in the instant situation the California 
Court of Appeals wrote: 
The "equitable tolling" doctrine is a recent 
innovation in California law. It evolved quickly 
and quietly during the 1970fs out of other related 
rationales for tolling statutes of limitation. . . 
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This doctrine aplies "'[w]hen an injured person has 
several remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, 
pursues one .f" 
191 Cal Rptr at 684, Citation to cases omitted. Emphasis 
added. It is interesting to note that, except for two early 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the California 
Court in Collier referred to NO non-California decisions (out 
of two dozen or so cited in the opinion). "Equitable tolling" 
is not only of "recent innovation", but appears to be 
limited to California! 
The Collier court continued: 
[There are] three factors [to be] considered in 
deciding whether "equitable tolling" should be 
applied in that case. . . These three core elements 
are: (1) timely notice to the defendant in filing 
the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendant 
in gathering evidence to defend against the second 
claim; and, (3) good faith and reasonable conduct 
by the plaintiff in filing the second claim. 
The timely notice requirement essentially 
means that the first claim must have been filed 
within the statutory period. 
191 Cal Rptr at 658. In the instant situation, the "first 
claim" was never filed until 1987. There is no "second 
claim"! When one reads Collier, it is obvious that the 
doctrine of "equitable tolling" applies, not to "class 
action" cases, but rather to multiple cases filed by the same 
piainti ff against essentially the same "defendant". 
"Equitable tolling" is not available in Utah. Even if it 
were, the Plaintiffs are ineligible for its application to 
them . 
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B. The Defendant is significantly prejudiced by the 
late-filed litigation 
Plaintiffs claim that the "Wescall" claim and litigation 
put the Defendant "on notice" as to their claims. That fact 
is strongly disputed by the Defendant. The "class" was never 
certified. Nor was anything said about a "public hearing" 
until 1981 long after the applicable statutes of 
limitations had already run for all claims except those of 
the "Wescall" plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the Defendant was 
"put on notice" as to their claims by the November 1977 
"Wescall" letter and thus suffers no detriment in defending 
against these untimely-filed actions. Whether the City was 
put "on notice" is not the purpose of the "statute of 
limitations", raised as defenses and bars to this proceeding. 
The Defendant has a right to have its case tried within a 
reasonable time of when the cause of action arose. 
The issue is not one of "notice", but rather THE BASIC 
UNFAIRNESS of forcing the Defendant to defend a case when 
evidence is lost, memories have faded, and witnesses are 
unavailable. 
C. Claimed tolling due to minor status of "limited partner" 
Plaintiff COVECREST PROPERTIES asserts that the statute 
of limitations is tolled, due to the "minority" of certain 
alleged "limited partners". The existence of such "minors" as 
"limited partners" will NOT toll the statute of limitation. 
The "general" partners and PARTNERSHIP ITSELF are responsible 
27 
for the legal protections afforded to the entity. It is 
interesting that Plaintiffs would assert such would preserve 
their claims. That when the fee was paid in 1978 there was an 
one-year-old "limited partner", for whom the statute of 
limitations should be "tolled". No "authority" is cited for 
such a proposition. Indeed, such should not nor cannot be the 
case. Such a result is contrary to common sense and logic. It 
is "the partnership" which is the legal entity, which 
ostensibly has suffered the "wrong" and which thus possess 
the cause of action. If the case were such that the "Walker" 
boy^ were, in reality and truth, a party litigant allegedly 
aggrieved by the payment of the impact fee and ostensibly the 
beneficiary of the "tolling" statute in this case, why then 
is the case [87-7980] filed in the partnership name of 
"Covecrest Properties" rather than "Bradford Walker"? The 
tolling, if any, of the statute of limitation is for the 
personal benefit of the minor, not for the benefit of the 
partnership! 
If a "partnership" cause of action could be thus 
preserved, every partnership would include as "limited 
partners" newborn babies so as to infinitely preserve 
forever, all claims that the "partnership" might have. Such a 
6 " B r a d f o r d " , who i s now "eleven and one-half years o l d " . At the time of the 
payment of the Covecrest impact fees i n 1978, he must have been a BRAND-NEW 
BABY! But, o f course, the P l a i n t i f f s now claim the " s ta tu te " was " t o l l e d " due to 
h is m inor i t y ! A baby's money used for the impact fee? The P l a i n t i f f s 1 assert ions 
are s t ra in ing at c r e d u l i t y . 
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l u d i c r o u s r e s u l t c o u l d n o t have been i n t e n d e d by t h e 
L e g i s l a t u r e i n a d o p t i n g t h e L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p A c t , S e c t i o n 
4 8 - 2 - 1 e t s e q , Utah Code. 
The P l a i n t i f f s ' c i t a t i o n o f t he Scot t vs School Board o f 
G r a n i t e Schoo l D i s t r i c t , 568 P.2d 746 ( U t a h 1977) i s 
m i s p l a c e d . O b v i o u s l y , t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n i s t o l l e d 
when t h e a l l e g e d i n j u r y i s d i r e c t l y commi t t ed upon t he minor 
and s u i t i s l a t e r b r o u g h t i n t h e name o f t h e m i n o r . N e i t h e r 
o f t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s i s p r e s e n t h e r e . 
D. The s t a t u t e i s " t o l l e d " ONLY u n t i l t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
DENIES " c l a s s " c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
P l a i n t i f f s r e p e a t e d l y a s s e r t t h a t t h e " s t a t u t e o f 
l i m i t a t i o n s i s t o l l e d u n t i l t h e c l a s s c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s s u e i s 
d e c i d e d by t h e c o u r t s . " They a s s e r t t h a t t h e " c l a s s a c t i o n " 
d e c i s i o n was kep t " p e n d i n g " u n t i l t h e J u l y 1986 d e c i s i o n o f 
t h e U tah Supreme C o u r t i n C a l l I I I . Such i s an ABSOLUTELY 
INCORRECT STATEMENT OF LAW. The s t a t u t e i s " t o l l e d " o n l y 
u n t i l t h e " c l a s s " c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s d e c i d e d by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ! Even t h e c a s e s c i t e d i n P l a i n t i f f s 1 B r i e f make t h a t 
p o i n t c l e a r ! 
Judge W inde r i n A p r i l 1978 DENIED CLASS 
C E R T I F I C A T I O N . At two o t h e r t i m e s o t h e r D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
j u d g e s e . g . Banks, T a y l o r DENIED CLASS CERTIFICATION, and 
t h e r e were i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l s on r e l a t e d i s s u e s . I n A p r i l 
1983 Judge Dee, as a " f i n a l j u d g m e n t " f rom when an appea l was 
t a k e n , DENIED CLASS CERTIFICATION. 
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The " s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n " , even i f " t o l l e d " pend ing 
t h e " c l a s s c e r t i f i c a t i o n " , s h o u l d have begun t o r u n a t t h a t 
t i m e . The i n s t a n t a c t i o n s were NOT FILED w i t h i n t h e f o u r 
y e a r s ? o f t h e d e n i a l . 
To a l l o w a " t o l l i n g " o f t h e " s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n " 
m e r e l y b e c a u s e Mr DeBry c o n t i n u e d t o " f l o g a dead h o r s e " 
w o u l d , i n e s s e n c e , c r e a t e t h e l e g a l e f f e c t t h e Utah Supreme 
C o u r t s a i d i t c o u l d n o t h a v e . Mr DeBry wanted t o r e p r e s e n t 
t h e " c l a s s " p l a i n t i f f s . [ T h e D e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d t h a t he 
c o u l d n ' t , as t h e named p l a i n t i f f s ( C a l l and J e n k i n s ) were i n 
a d i f f e r e n t " s u b c l a s s " t h a n t h e o t h e r unnamed " c l a s s " 
p l a i n t i f f s , as C a l l and J e n k i n s had f i l e d " n o t i c e " w h i c h t h e 
o t h e r p l a i n t i f f s had n o t . ] The Supreme Cour t r u l e d t h a t Judge 
Dee was c o r r e c t . 
T h i s i s no t t h e case where t h e c l a s s was " c e r t i f i e d " and 
t h e c l a s s members r e l i e d on t h e " c l a s s a c t i o n " c a s e , s u c h 
t h a t t h e y r e f r a i n e d f r o m f i l i n g l i t i g a t i o n . The s o u g h t - f o r 
c l a s s was NEVER " c e r t i f i e d " . As s u c h , t h e s u p p o s e d " c l a s s 
a c t i o n " was n o t h i n g more t h a n Mr DeBry 1 s w i s h f u l , b u t l e g a l l y 
i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l , s u p e r f l u o u s a l l e g a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e 
" W e s c a l l " c o m p l a i n t . Those a l l e g a t i o n s w e r e n ' t even r e l i e d 
upon by t h e p r e s e n t P l a i n t i f f s ! [ I f t h e y had r e l i e d upon 
them w h i c h t h e y d i d n ' t t h e y s h o u l d have had " s e c o n d 
t h o u g h t s " about t h e success o f t h e " c l a s s a c t i o n " when Judge 
7 This i s not t o mean t h a t the Defendant accepts the "four year" s ta tu te of 
l i m i t a t i o n argument as being the only appl icable s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n . This i s 
merely to show t h a t by t h e i r own argument, t h e i r l i t i g a t i o n was not t imely 
f i l e d . 
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W i n d e r r e f u s e d c l a s s c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n A p r i l 1978! And when 
t h e subsequen t j udges s i m i l a r l y r e f u s e d ! And when Judge Dee 
r e f u s e d i n A p r i l 1 9 8 3 ! ] The P l a i n t i f f s DID NOTHING! They 
s i m p l y " b e t on t h e wrong h o r s e " . They s h o u l d n o t be a l l o w e d 
t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e i r a c t i o n s f i l e d so LATE, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
when t h e " s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s " has been so a b s o l u t e l y 
c l e a r . 
I f t h e C o u r t a c c e p t s t h e P l a i n t i f f s 1 a r g u m e n t ( r e : 
" t o l l i n g " w h i l e an appea l i s s t i l l p e n d i n g ) , t h e C o u r t w o u l d 
have t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e " s t a t u t e " i s s t i l l " t o l l e d " as t h e 
" W e s c a l l " case i s s t i l l on a p p e a l ( t h i s t i m e , t o t h e Utah 
Supreme Cour t on a P e t i t i o n f o r C e r t i o r a r i ) . There i s a l r e a d y 
a C a l l IV d e c i s i o n . 129 Utah Advance Repor t s 38 (U tah Cour t 
o f Appea ls 1 9 9 0 ) . There may p o s s i b l e be a C a l l V d e c i s i o n ! I n 
any o f t h o s e d e c i s i o n s , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s m i g h t r e v e r s e 
t h e m s e l v e s w i t h i n t h e same case ( a s t h e Supreme Cour t d i d 
f r o m C a l l I I t o C a l l I I I ) and d e c i d e o t h e r w i s e on the " c l a s s 
a c t i o n " i s s u e . T h u s , as a m i n i m u m , t h e " t o l l i n g " o f t h e 
" s t a t u t e " w o u l d e x t e n d u n t i l 1 9 9 0 . Add ing t he " f o u r y e a r s " 
w o u l d be 1 9 9 4 . T h u s , someone s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d t o R & D 
E n g i n e e r s ( f o r example , i n 88 -4700 ) would have NINETEEN YEARS 
i n which t o f i l e s u i t f o r t h e r e f u n d o f t he impact fees p a i d . 
T h a t c o n c l u s i o n i s so c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e so c o n t r a r y t o t h e 
o b v i o u s l e g i s l a t i v e p u r p o s e b e h i n d a " s t a t u t e o f 
l i m i t a t i o n " t h a t i t shows t h e weakness o f P l a i n t i f f s ' 
a s s e r t i o n s . 
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Plaintiffs misread the holding of the United States 
Supreme Court in the case of American Pipe and Construction 
vs Utah, 414 US 538, 38 LEd2d 713, 94 SCt 756 (1974). In 
American Pipe the United States Supreme Court wrote: 
. . . The same concept leads to the conclusion that 
the commencement of the class action in this cases 
suspended the running of the limitation period only 
during the pendency of the motion to strip the suit 
of its class action characterT The class suit 
brought b"y Ut ah was f il ed with 11 days yet to run 
in the period as tolled by § 5(b), and the 
intervenors thus had 11 days after the entry of the 
order denying them participation in the suit as 
class members in which to move for permission to 
intervene. Since their motions were filed only 
eight days after the entry of Judge Pence's order, 
it follows the motions were timely. 
Emphasis added. 94 SCt at 770. Emphasis added. Obviously the 
rule is that the "statute" is tolled only for the short time 
until class status is denied. That first occurred in April 
1978. Thus, the applicable "statute of limitation would be 
"tolled" a mere 73 DAYS [from February 7, 1978 (the date of 
filing of the original "Wescall" case to April 21, 1978 (the 
date Judge Winder signed the order denying class 
certification)], not THIRTEEN YEARS as Plaintiff would have 
the Court believe. 
P l a i n t i f f s m i s q u o t e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s 
h o l d i n g i n C r o w n , Cork & S e a l Company, I n c . vs P a r k e r , 462 US 
3 4 5 , 76 LEd2d 6 2 8 , 103 SCt 2 3 9 2 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , i n w h i c h t h e C o u r t 
wrote: 
Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it 
remains tolled for all members of the putative 
class until class certification is denied. At that 
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point, class members may choose to file their own 
suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending 
action. 
103 SCt at 2397-2398, Emphasis added. In Parker the Court 
obviously meant denial of class certification by the trial 
court, as the Court concluded the plaintiff had but "90 days" 
(as allowed by statute), rather than the years and years it 
would have taken to perfect the appeal. One "intervenes" 
prior to trial, not following an appeal! The sought-for 
class "certification" was decided (i.e. DENIED) by Judge 
Winder (April 1978). The arguably "tolled" statute of 
limitation began to run on April 22, 1978 and barred the 
Plaintiffs1 claims long before these actions were filed in 
1987 and 1988! 
In American Pipe and Parker there were specific statutes 
which tolled the "statute of limitation" during the pendency 
of the class action prior to initial denial of class 
certification. 
IV 
FACTUAL ISSUES PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was for the 
purpose of "striking" the "factually-intensive" defenses 
which had been properly pleaded by the Defendant: defenses of 
mistake, waiver, estoppel, laches, and unjust enrichment are 
meritorious and are pleaded in good faith. Those "defenses" 
ought to be obvious from the face of the pleadings. 
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The f a c t u a l l y - i n t e n s i v e " d e f e n s e s " o f l a c h e s , u n j u s t 
e n r i c h m e n t , m i s t a k e , e s t o p p e l and wa i ve r a re a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
D e f e n d a n t ; t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h o s e f a c t u a l l y - i n t e n s i v e 
" d e f e n s e s " p r e c l u d e s t h e g r a n t i n g o f summary j u d g m e n t i n 
f a v o r o f t h e P l a i n t i f f s . 
A . The " c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l " i s s u e s were NOT l i t i g a t e d 
p r e v i o u s l y 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 c o u n s e l (Mr DeBry) i n c o r r e c t l y i m p l i e s [ p . 
41 o f P l a i n t i f f s 1 B r i e f ] t h e r e was a f u l l o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
l i t i g a t e t h e " d e f e n s e s " were l i t i g a t e d i n t h e " W e s c a l l " case 
f o l l o w i n g remand f rom t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t . He a l s o i m p l i e s 
t h a t t h e C i t y l o s t on t h o s e i s s u e s and s h o u l d t h u s be 
p r e c l u d e d f r o m l i t i g a t i n g t h o s e " d e f e n s e s " a g a i n s t t h e 
i n s t a n t p l a i n t i f f s . P l a i n t i f f s 1 B r i e f i s a b s o l u t e l y 
INCORRECT, on b o t h c o u n t s , as a m a t t e r o f f a c t and as a 
m a t t e r o f l a w . 
What t h e P l a i n t i f f LEAVES OUT o f t h e l i t t l e " h i s t o r y " o f 
t h e " W e s c a l l " c a s e i s THE FACT t h a t f o l l o w i n g Judge D e e ' s 
a l l o w a n c e o f t h e f i l i n g o f t h e " a m e n d e d " a n s w e r , Mr 
DeBry as p l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n s e l i n " W e s c a l l " f i l e d i n t h e 
U t a h Supreme Cou r t a p e t i t i o n f o r " w r i t o f mandamus" a g a i n s t 
" J u d g e Dee and s u c c e s s o r j u d g e s " - - P R E V E N T I N G JUDGE DEE AND 
THOSE SUCCESSOR JUDGES from c o n d u c t i n g f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s on 
t h e m e r i t s o f t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s " d e f e n s e s " . C o n t r a r y t o t h e 
a s s e r t i o n s o f P l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n s e l (Mr D e B r y ) , t h e " d e f e n s e s " 
were NOT f u l l y l i t i g a t e d ! 
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To say that they were is a BLATANT MISREPRESENTATION OF 
LAW AND FACT. [There were a number of hearings: on the 
plaintiffs1 (John Call and Clark Jenkins) motions for 
"joinder" of "additional" plaintiffs following the remand.] A 
photocopy of the petition for writ of mandamus and the 
"minute order" portions of the "mandamus" action are included 
herewith. In compliance with the "writ", issued by Supreme 
Court, further proceedings on the "defenses" WERE NOT HELD! 
[See ADDENDA Exhibits "A", "B" and "C".] The Defendant should 
not be collaterally estopped from litigating "defenses" which 
were never fully litigated. 
B. "Collateral estoppel" is factually-related 
Plaintiffs want the Court to rule "as a matter of law" 
that the fact-intensiv e issues of "mistake", "waiver", 
"estoppel", "unjust enrichment", etc., are inappropriate. 
Such a determination can be made only after a trial of the 
issues, when such factual issues have been developed. 
Even if the issues had been litigated unsuccessfully by 
the City in the "Wescall" that case would not mean that the 
City was precluded from litigating that same "defense" in a 
different case with a A DIFFERENT DEVELOPER in a DIFFERENT 
SUBDIVISION which ACTED DIFFERENTLY. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs have not complied with the pertinent 
statutory requirements necessary to file and maintain an 
action against a governmental entity. Furthermore, the 
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t e r s e l y - w o r d e d c o m p l a i n t s a r e " f a t a l l y d e f e c t i v e " 
[ R o o s e n d a h l ] f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e t o even a l l e g e s u c h 
c o m p l i a n c e . 
The P I a i n t i f f s f c l a i m s a r o s e when t h e y p a i d t he impac t 
f e e s . Those p a y m e n t s were made i n 1975 and i n 1 9 7 7 . The 
l i t i g a t i o n was f i l e d i n 1987 and 1 9 8 8 , b e t w e e n NINE AND 
THIRTEEN YEARS LATER. T h e i r c l a i m s a r e b a r r e d by numerous 
s t a t u t e s o f l i m i t a t i o n s . Those s t a t u t e s are n o t t o l l e d . 
P l a i n t i f f s ' m o t i o n f o r summary judgment t o " s t r i k e " t h e 
f a c t u a l l y - o r i e n t e d d e f e n s e s o f " m i s t a k e " , " u n j u s t 
e n r i c h m e n t " , " l a c h e s " , " e s t o p p e l " and " w a i v e r " c o u l d n o t be 
g r a n t e d , b e c a u s e t h e f a c t u a l n a t u r e o f t h o s e d e f e n s e s 
p r e c l u d e s t h e g r a n t i n g o f summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s . C o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s are no t a v a i l a b l e 
t o t h e P l a i n t i f f s . The " d e f e n s e s " were NOT l i t i g a t e d i n t h e 
" W e s c a l l " c a s e . Even i f t h o s e " d e f e n s e s " had been l i t i g a t e d , 
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e C i t y may n o t have p r e v a i l e d a g a i n s t t h e 
" W e s c a l l " p l a i n t i f f s does no t mean t h a t t h o s e f a c t - i n t e n s i v e 
d e f e n s e s canno t be l i t i g a t e d a g a i n s t t he i n s t a n t P l a i n t i f f s . 
T h i s a p p e a l i s f r i v o l o u s and was f i l e d m e r e l y f o r t h e 
pu rpose o f d e l a y and c o n t i n u e d h a r a s s m e n t o f t h e D e f e n d a n t . 
The D e f e n d a n t s e e k s an award o f a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and c o s t s 
i n c u r r e d i n d e f e n d i n g a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s 1 c l a i m s r e a d i l y 
d i s p o s e d o f by t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , as no ted h e r e i n . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h i s 2 7 t h day o f A u g u s t , 1990 . 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t 
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CERTIFICATE 
I c e r t i f y t h a t I caused t o be h a n d - d e l i v e r e d a f o u r c o p i e s o f 
o f t h e f o r e g o i n g RESPONDENT'S BRIEF t o Mr R o b e r t J D e B r y , 
4252 S o u t h 700 E a s t , S u i t e 5 0 0 , M u r r a y , Utah 84107, 
Mr Mel S M a r t i n , 900 Kenneco t t B u i l d i n g , 10 East South 
S t r e e t , 
A u g u s t , 
Salt 
1990. 
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